Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI

Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια — Aristotle, 4th century BCE

There are several ways of being intelligent, and the most important for living — practical wisdom — is neither science nor cleverness.

What the text says

Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics is devoted to the virtues of the intellect. Aristotle distinguishes scientific knowledge, which demonstrates what is necessary; craft, which knows how to make; intuitive understanding, which grasps first principles; theoretical wisdom; and phronesis, practical wisdom, which deliberates about what should be done.

He adds a neighbouring and troubling capacity: cleverness, the talent for finding the means to any goal whatsoever. The wise person is clever, but the clever person is not necessarily wise. Without the virtue that directs our ends, cleverness becomes knavery.

Why read it now

We are building systems that excel at finding means. Aristotle located the question of ends elsewhere: in experience, character, shared life. Rereading Book VI means measuring what artificial intelligence does not settle on its own — and what, perhaps, cannot be delegated.

What remains open

Can an intelligence that has never had anything to lose acquire practical wisdom?